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This essay describes some basic tax-planning strategies under 
the destination based cash flow tax (DBCFT) proposed as part of the 
“Blueprint” published by the Committee on Ways & Means of the 
House of Representatives. 1   This article is designed first for 
policymakers so that they can either correct or confirm the strategies I 
describe, and second for the practitioners and taxpayers that will 
navigate the DBCFT if it is enacted.  
A central theme of the discussion that follows is that the 
DBCFT contained in the Blueprint is not the “pure” DBCFT proposed 
by economists.2  Instead, it is a hybrid that incorporates aspects of the 
pure DBCFT, but also elements of our current income tax.  Many of 
the planning opportunities under the DBCFT arise because of its 
hybrid nature. 
II. TAX PLANNING UNDER THE DBCFT 
A. Generating Deductions 
Tax planning under an income tax system is based upon 
maximizing deductions and avoiding or deferring income.  To 
illustrate, assume a U.S. pharmaceutical company (currently subject to 
a nominal U.S. corporate tax rate of 35%) has an Irish subsidiary 
(currently subject to a nominal rate of 12.5%).  Under current income 
tax law, the U.S. parent would seek to transfer intellectual property to 
its Irish subsidiary at a low transfer price, develop the intellectual 
property substantially using personnel located in Ireland, and have the 
Irish subsidiary receive royalty payments from unrelated parties that 
would not be Subpart F income.3  The U.S. parent would report any 
gain on the initial sale, but could defer the subsequent profits of the 
Irish subsidiary indefinitely. 
                                                      
1 A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, GOP TAX REFORM 
TASK FORCE (June 24, 2016), 
http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf 
[perma.cc/G6B3-YMT3] [hereinafter Blueprint].  
2 See Auerbach, et al., Destination Based Cash-Flow Taxation 17 (Oxford 
U. Ctr. for Bus. Tax’n, Working Paper No. 17/01, 2017).  When I refer to the 
DBCFT, I mean the one in the Blueprint.  I refer to the one proposed by economists 
as the “pure” DBCFT. 
3 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2T(c)(3)(i) (exempting royalty income 
earned with respect to property to which the foreign subsidiary has “added 
substantial value” if “regularly engaged in the development, creation, or production 
of … property of such kind”). 
All references to section numbers are to the Internal Revenue Code or its 
regulations. 
298 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.8:295 
 
 
Under a DBCFT, generating deductions onshore would remain 
an important tax planning strategy, but the tools to accomplish this 
strategy would change.  For example, interest could no longer be used 
to strip earnings, but deductions could be generated by making capital 
investments that may be immediately expensed.  For example, a 
taxpaying company operating under a DBCFT could generate 
deductions by buying business assets and leasing them (especially to 
companies (like exporters) that could not use the deductions that would 
be generated from purchasing the equipment).  Likewise, a taxpaying 
company could buy a building, and lease it back to the seller.  The 
purchase of the building would generate a deduction, which could 
shelter other income.   
Returning to the example above, if the DBCFT is enacted, the 
U.S. pharmaceutical company’s strategy would be reversed.  The U.S. 
parent would fully develop the intellectual property in the United 
States with its own employees.  Their salaries would be deductible.   
B. Excluding Income from Exports 
Under a DBCFT, exporting products, services, and intangibles 
abroad is even more important than deferring income because the 
proceeds would be exempt under the tax’s border adjustment feature.  
Exporting may be accomplished by providing products, services, and 
intangibles to a foreign customer, but also to a foreign affiliate.  The 
Blueprint appears to respect the residence of entities, and because the 
corporate residence of a client or affiliate is effectively elective, there 
are plenty of tax planning opportunities to create exports.4 
C. Transforming an Onshore Brick and Mortar Importing 
Business into an Online Direct-Order Business 
Conducted by a Foreign Subsidiary 
Next, consider a U.S. corporation that is in the domestic retail 
sales business.  It buys all of its products domestically at wholesale 
prices and sells them at retail prices to U.S. customers.  Now assume 
that this U.S. corporation organizes a wholly-owned Irish subsidiary 
that qualifies for the benefits of the U.S.-Irish tax treaty.  The Irish 
subsidiary could buy the products from its U.S. parent, and then sell 
the products directly to the customers of its parent, with the assistance 
of an independent agent located in the United States.  Under the 
                                                      
4 The OECD’s International VAT/GST [goods and services tax] 
guidelines would also respect the sales of services and intangibles to the immediate 
buyer without looking through to subsequent users.  See Chapter 3 of the 
International VAT/GST Guidelines, OECD (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/consumption/international-vat-gst-guidelines.pdf 
[perma.cc/K53K-YZK3].  




Blueprint, the U.S. corporation could exclude the gross proceeds from 
the export to its Irish subsidiary.  The Irish subsidiary would avoid 
U.S. federal income tax because it would not have a permanent 
establishment in the United States by reason of all activities being 
conducted through an independent agent. 5   In fact, because the 
Blueprint would repeal the foreign base company sales rules,6 the Irish 
subsidiary's profits would not be Subpart F income and could be 
repatriated tax-free to its U.S. parent.  Thus, under the Blueprint, the 
U.S. parent could avoid all U.S. federal income tax. 
 To prevent this outcome, the United States would first have to 
dramatically expand its extra-territorial taxing powers to impose a 20% 
excise tax on the price of goods, services and intangibles sold by any 
foreign entity directly to a U.S. consumer, regardless of whether that 
entity has a physical presence in the United States.  Additionally, the 
United States would have to modify tax treaties to permit the United 
States to impose tax on a resident of a treaty jurisdiction that sells into 
the United States, even if the resident does not have a permanent 
establishment in the United States.7  Enforcing these powers would be 
very difficult.  Convincing our treaty partners to agree to these changes 
will be equally difficult.8 
D. Earnings and Profits Under the DBCFT 
Assume that a U.S. corporation, in its first year of operation, 
receives $100 from exports, and has total costs of $85 (but no imports).  
It earns economic income of $15, but has a tax loss of $85 (because it 
is able to exclude the $100 of export revenue).  Now assume the 
corporation distributes all of its revenue.  Under our current income 
                                                      
5 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, 
U.S.-Ir., art. 5, July 28, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-31 (1997); Id. at art 6 (an 
enterprise does not have a permanent establishment merely by carrying on business 
through a broker or agent of independent status); Id. at art. 7 (profits of an 
enterprise are taxable by the other contracting state only if carrying on business 
through a permanent establishment situated in that state).  Best Buy argues that 
China’s Alibaba would be able to avoid the tax by making sales online and 
shipping to U.S. consumers directly.  Ginger Gibson & David Shepardson, How 
Toyota, Target, Best Buy are Fighting Back Against Republican Border Tax Push, 
REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-companies-
tax-insight-idUSKBN15F0FK [perma.cc/7QDX-AC4G].  
6 Supra note 1 at 29. 
7 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, & Kimberly Clausing, Problems with 
Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 
229 (2017).  
8 See David P. Hariton, Planning for Border Adjustments: A Practical 
Analysis, 154 TAX NOTES 965 (2017). 
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tax system, if a corporation has a tax loss in its first year of operation 
and makes a distribution, the distribution is treated as a return of capital 
(because generally a tax loss also means a deficit in earnings and 
profits).  What result under the DBCFT?   
The Blueprint is silent but my guess is that distributions, to the 
extent of earnings and profits (determined under current rules), would 
be treated as dividends.  If the dollar appreciates to neutralize the effect 
of a DBCFT, and exporters can fully use their losses, then importers, 
exporters, and wholly domestic businesses should have the same 
amount of after-tax income after a border adjustment as they did before 
the enactment.  In that case, the shareholders who receive equal 
distributions from equally profitable start-up companies should be 
taxable the same, regardless of whether the companies are importers, 
exporters, or wholly domestic.  Shareholders would be taxable on an 
income tax basis with respect to their investment income under the 
DBCFT, and so dividends should be determined under the same rules 
as today.   
However, to achieve this result under the DBCFT, corporations 
would have to keep two tax books.  One set of books would be kept on 
a cash flow basis to determine corporate-level tax.  The second would 
be on an income tax basis to determine earnings and profits.9  As 
explained in the next part, the retention of the earnings and profits 
concept permits tax planning opportunities that do not exist under a 
“pure” DBCFT. 
E. Using Corporate Inversions 
Corporate inversions will still have benefits under the 
Blueprint.  For example, an Irish parent could raise debt financing (and 
deduct the interest) to fund its U.S. subsidiary’s deductible capital 
investments.  The U.S. subsidiary could develop intellectual property 
and sell the foreign rights to the Irish parent on a tax-free basis, and 
the Irish parent would amortize the purchase price and deduct the 
interest to reduce its earnings and profits.  For example, assume that 
the Irish parent borrows $1,000 to buy its U.S. subsidiary’s intellectual 
property.  Assume the U.S. subsidiary has more than $100 of earnings 
and profits.  In a taxable year, the Irish parent has $100 of original 
issue discount and the U.S. subsidiary pays a dividend of $100 to its 
Irish parent which, in turn, pays the amount to its U.S. shareholders.  
Had the Irish parent not existed, the dividend would have been taxable 
                                                      
9 Of course, this begs the questions about how earnings and profits would 
be determined under a DBCFT.  Would today’s rules be used, would the rules 
measure earnings and profits based on an economic income basis, or would 
investments be expensed and interests denied? 




to the U.S. subsidiary’s U.S. shareholders, or subject to U.S. 
withholding tax on payment to its foreign shareholders.  However, in 
the year of the dividend, the Irish parent has no current or accumulated 
earnings and profits (the $100 dividend received is offset by the $100 
of original issue discount expense) and so the dividend it pays its 
shareholders would be a nontaxable return of capital. 
In fact, this strategy is equally available to a nonconsolidated 
U.S. parent company that receives a dividend from its U.S. subsidiary.  
The U.S. parent would have no net income by reasons of the dividends-
received deduction, and the original issue discount deduction would 
offset its dividend income for earnings and profits purposes.  The U.S. 
parent could distribute the dividend it receives to its U.S. shareholders 
without income tax or to its foreign shareholders without U.S. 
withholding tax.10 
F. Using Transfer Pricing to Import at a Low Cost 
One of the principal benefits of a DBCFT would be to remove 
the incentive for U.S. multinationals to sell intellectual property at 
low-transfer pricing rates to affiliated Irish (or other low-taxed treaty-
eligible) companies.  However, for those U.S. multinationals that had 
previously transferred U.S. intellectual property to their offshore 
subsidiaries and would need to license it back, under the DBCFT, the 
royalty payments would be nondeductible import expense and, to add 
insult to injury, the income of the subsidiary would be Subpart F 
income.  These U.S. multinationals would seek to pay a low transfer-
pricing royalty rate.  Therefore, the DBCFT does not avoid transfer 
pricing; it merely changes the situations where transfer pricing matters. 
G. Generating and Using Export Losses 
Under the DBCFT, exporters would generate losses that they 
will be unable to use.  Exporters will therefore become acquisition 
targets for importers that are denied deductions for their imports (and 
vice versa).11  These would be acquisitions principally for tax reasons 
– the DBCFT’s version of an inversion.   Also, the DBCFT would 
encourage exporters to buy importers’ goods directly from abroad, and 
                                                      
10 I thank Michael Schler for this example. 
11 Elena Patel & John McClelland, What Would a Cash Flow Tax Look 
Like for U.S. Companies? Lessons from a Historical Panel (Office of Tax 
Analysis, Working Paper No. 116, 2017), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-116.pdf [perma.cc/T47D-6MRS] at 
15-16 (“Given the magnitude of the border adjustment, we expect that in the 
absence of a means of using these losses these larger firms would have an outsized 
incentive for behavioral adjustments such restructuring through mergers and 
acquisitions to minimize taxes.”). 
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sell them to the importer.12  Because the exporter would not receive a 
deduction (or basis) for the imported goods, this strategy would allow 
the exporter to use its tax losses and effectively sell those losses to the 
importer. 
H. Converting Carry from Foreign Investors into Tax-
Exempt Export Income 
A DBCFT would also provide a windfall for managers of 
Cayman Island funds.  Currently, fund managers receive a relatively 
small fixed management fee (say 2%) of assets under management and 
a larger carried interest (say 20% of gains) that potentially benefit from 
long-term capital gains rates.  Under a DBCFT, a U.S. hedge fund 
manager would seek to restructure its compensation entirely as 
contingent fees for services provided to foreign investors.13  All of 
these fees would be excludible exports (and not at all at taxed).14  
Additionally, unlike consumer goods, this exported service would not 
reflect any dollar appreciation because both parties would be 
transacting in dollars.   
The question then arises whether the Blueprint will treat 
services provided to a Cayman Islands fund that is entirely owned by 
U.S. pension plans as provided to a foreigner (so entirely exempt) or 
to the beneficial U.S. owners (so fully taxable). 15   Compensation 
received from taxable domestic investors would remain structured as 
carried interests (unless the income would be exempt if restructured as 
fees received from a Cayman Islands corporation owned by these 
investors).  All expenses from salaries and overhead (used to generate 
both excludable and taxable amounts) could be used to offset taxable 
amounts. 
In addition, under the DBCFT, lawyers who set up funds for 
U.S. money managers would no longer be paid by the managers but 
instead would be paid by the foreign funds to avoid tax on their fees 
(or at least the portion attributable to the foreign investors).  Likewise, 
                                                      
12 Michael Schler originally suggested this strategy. 
13 If the DBCFT does not look through entities, then this strategy would be 
equally effective for tax-exempt or taxable investors that invest through a Cayman 
corporation. 
14 Max Ehrenfreund, Trump Said They Were ‘Getting Away with Murder.’ 
Now They Might Be Getting a Tax Break, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/02/08/the-gop-tax-plan-
could-mean-a-big-break-for-some-of-donald-trumps-least-favorite-
people/?utm_term=.f457837564d0 [perma.cc/6LXG-9Z3T].  
15 For more examples, see Hariton, supra note 8. 




if a foreign parent purchases a U.S. corporation, the law firm will 
prefer to be paid by the foreign parent, rather than the target. 
I. The Preference of Capital Assets Over Financial 
Assets 
Because the DBCFT applies a cash-flow tax to physical and 
intangible assets but an income tax to financial assets, taxpayers would 
be able to expense their purchase of capital assets (like equipment) but 
not financial assets.  Therefore, a financial investor might be expected 
to shift his investments from financial assets to physical and intangible 
assets (at least until the difference in potential return offsets the tax 
savings).  
Likewise, a U.S. corporation considering the purchase of a 
domestic target will have an even greater incentive than under current 
law to structure the acquisition as an asset purchase rather than a stock 
purchase because of the immediate deduction for equipment and 
improvements.   
J. Using Affiliate Sales to Achieve a Tax-Free Step-Up 
The entirety of the U.S. international income tax system is 
based on taxing outbound transactions and exempting inbound 
ones.  That system would be upended by the Blueprint.  If a DBCFT is 
enacted, most outbound transactions would become exempt (as 
exports), but the rules would have to be changed to tax what are now 
tax-free inbound contributions (as imports).  Otherwise, a U.S. 
subsidiary could sell inventory to its foreign parent, and the foreign 
parent could contribute the inventory to another U.S. subsidiary in a 
section 351 transaction.  If the second U.S. subsidiary received the 
parent’s fair market value basis in the inventory, the second subsidiary 
could then sell the inventory in the United States and pay no tax.  A 
similar opportunity may exist for land, which is not subject to the 
DBCFT.  Conversely, an inbound section 351 transaction would have 
to be treated as an import for which the subsidiary could not receive 
basis or claim a deduction.  Under a pure DBCFT, these changes would 
not be necessary because basis does not exist under a pure DBCFT.  
But the Blueprint’s DBCFT does retain the LIFO method of 
accounting for inventory, and excludes land. 
K. Using Partnerships to Sell Export Losses to Importers 
Assume that a domestic partnership has two businesses:  A 
domestic sales business and an exporting business.  Each business 
earns revenues of $100, pays wages of $20, and purchases domestic 
inventory of $30.   
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Each business has pre-tax profits of $50.  However, the export 
business generates a tax loss of $50, which is worth $10 based on a 
20% tax rate.  The domestic business has taxable income of $50 and 
pays tax of $10.  On a combined basis, the partnership earns after-tax 
profit of $100.  However, the domestic business pays tax of $10 and 
the exports business generates a loss of $50 (worth $10), so the 
combined business pays no tax. 




Domestic 100 -20 -30 50 10 40 
Foreign 100 -20 -30 50 -10 60 
Let’s assume that one partner is allocated all of the pre-tax 
economic income from the domestic business and the other is allocated 
all of the pre-tax economic income from the export business, and they 
agree to share the tax in accordance with relative profits.  Since each 
business had the same pretax profit and, as a whole, the business paid 
no tax, they distribute 50 to each partner. 
Although this allocation would appear to have substantial 
economic effect under current law, I suspect that it wouldn’t be 
allowable under the Blueprint.  This partnership is a “splitter”.  The 
tax benefit (exclusion of export income) is intended for exporters.  
Exporters are not entitled to refunds of their tax losses, and they must 
have income under the DBCFT in future years to use then.  
Presumably, the drafters of the Blueprint didn’t intend for exporters to 
be able to sell their losses.16  In this case, only the partner who is 
allocated the economic income from exporting should be entitled to 
the tax benefits from that activity.  The domestic partner should be 
distributed $40 and the exporting partner $60.  It also becomes clear 
from this example that tax does not follow book under the DBCFT.  
Capital accounts are an economic income concept; the DBCFT is not.  
Likewise, the allocation of an exporting tax loss to a partner should not 
reduce that partner’s basis.  Otherwise the exclusion would become a 
mere deferral. 
L. Tax-Exempt Entities 
Under our current income tax system, tax-exempt entities 
avoid tax on income from the activities that are related to their tax-
exempt status.  However, under the DBCFT, exporters would pay no 
                                                      
16 This is another example where a “pure” DBCFT varies from the 
Blueprint’s version.  A pure DBCFT would allow exporters a refund or, at the very 
least, allow the loss to offset payroll taxes. 




tax and would receive deductions for their costs.  For tax-exempt 
organizations that are also exporters, under a DBCFT, it would be 
better to be taxable than tax-exempt. 
Assume that a U.S. university develops a video-based degree 
for which it receives tuition and fees from foreign students.  Because 
under current law the tuition and fees are exempt from tax,17 it makes 
more sense for the university to operate the video-based degree 
business as tax-exempt and neither pay tax nor generate deductions. 
Under the DBCFT, the university would have an incentive to 
contribute the business to a taxable subsidiary.  The taxable subsidiary 
would not pay any tax and would generate tax losses from the export 
business, even if the business were profitable.  The university could 
also contribute to the taxable subsidiary assets that generate unrelated 
business taxable income and the subsidiary’s losses could be used to 
help to shelter what would otherwise be taxable to the university.18 
M. Using U.S. Corporations as Tax Shelters 
Under a DBCFT, U.S. corporations would become a tax shelter 
for wealthy shareholders.  First, under the rates proposed by the 
Blueprint, there would be an increase in the disparity between the 
corporate rate and the top individual rate (13 percentage points as 
compared to under 9 percentage points today).19  Second, exporters 
would be in perennial loss positions.  Shareholders could contribute 
their investment assets to their export companies and use the export 
losses to reduce the tax rate on their investment earnings to zero.  The 
personal holding company rules and accumulated earnings tax 
attempted to prevent this practice, but were notoriously unsuccessful.20 
 
 
                                                      
17 See I.R.C. § 512 (2015) (excluding royalties from definition of 
“unrelated business taxable income” on which an otherwise exempt organization 
may be subject to tax). 
18 I thank Richard Upton for his comments on this section. 
19 The top marginal rates under the Blueprint for individuals and 
corporations, respectively, are 33% and 20%.  See supra note 1, at 17, 25. 
20 See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Sorry State of Capital Income Taxation, 
N.Y.U. School of Law Colloquium on Tax Pol’y & Pub. Fin. (Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_071841.pdf 
[perma.cc/Q339-R5TY] (personal holding company and accumulated earnings tax 
are inadequate to protect the fisc from capital stuffing); see also David A. 
Weisbach, A Guide to the GOP Tax Plan – The Way to a Better Way, 8 COLUM. J. 
TAX L. 171 (2017) (same problem existed in the Bush tax commission’s Growth 
and Investment Tax Plan).  
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N. Preserving Interest Deductions 
Under the DBCFT, net interest deductions are denied.  
However, if the DBCFT were simply incorporated into our existing 
income tax system, taxpayers would be able to achieve the functional 
equivalent of a deduction for interest. 
Assume that an individual investor holds an interest in a 
domestic feeder fund that is treated as a partnership for U.S. federal 
tax purposes.  The domestic feeder fund, in turn, invests in a leveraged 
hedge fund that is also treated as a partnership.  Under the DBCFT, 
interest deductions would be denied for the hedge fund’s interest 
expense.  However, if the taxpayer were instead to invest in a foreign 
feeder fund that is a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) or a 
passive foreign investment corporation (“PFIC”) that has made a 
qualified electing fund (“QEF”) election, and the foreign feeder fund 
invests in the hedge fund partnership, then the interest expense of the 
hedge fund partnership would reduce the earnings and profits of the 
foreign feeder fund, which could include interest, dividend income, 
and capital gains.  Through this mechanism, interest expense, which is 
only supposed to offset interest income, could offset other income as 
well. 
Alternatively, the taxpayer could use any of a number of 
financial instruments that are not characterized as indebtedness (and 
therefore do not generate interest expense) but contain time value 
components.  For example, a contract that provides an up-front 
payment for the obligation to deliver commodities or publicly-traded 
security in the future contains a significant time value component, 
which would offset income on the delivery but would not be treated as 
interest.  If interest deductions are denied, these and similar 
arrangements could be used to achieve the effect of an interest 
deduction.21 
On the other hand, for a taxpayer that does incur interest 
expense, interest income would be desirable because interest expense 
could be deducted only against interest income.  Under current income 
                                                      
21 It is possible that the Blueprint intends to deny interest expense only for 
borrowings that are used to buy property that is expensed.  This would be 
consistent with the purpose behind the denial – to treat the marginal effective rate 
of new investment to be zero.  The Blueprint retains an income tax for financial 
assets, and so it would be consistent to allow interest deductions for debt used to 
purchase financial assets.  Then interest would be entirely disallowed on debt used 
to purchase expensed property (and not allowable to the extent of interest income), 
and entirely allowable with respect to other debt (and not limited to the extent of 
interest income).  However, because money is fungible, tracing rules would be easy 
to avoid. 




tax law, taxpayers have quite a lot of flexibility to combine various 
financial instruments with debt, and create a single debt instrument that 
generates only interest income.   
For example, assume that a taxpayer has excess interest 
expense.  The taxpayer wishes to purchase both a $1,000 bond from a 
financial institution and a $100 at-the-money option with respect to the 
stock of a publicly-traded company.  The taxpayer could combine the 
two instruments into a single contingent payment debt instrument 
(“CPDI”): The taxpayer would advance $1,100 to the financial 
institution and receive back at maturity $1,000 plus the increase in the 
value of the publicly-traded company.  Although the taxpayer’s 
economics would have not changed, the taxpayer’s entire return on its 
combined investment would be interest income, which could be offset 
by the taxpayer’s excess interest expense.  Had the taxpayer instead 
kept the two investments separate, gain on the option would not be 
treated as interest income. 
O. Foreign Companies Could Move to the United States 
to Receive a Subsidy 
Foreign companies that make goods and sell them abroad and 
whose employees are in the 15% tax bracket could receive a U.S. 
subsidy by moving their operations to the United States, claiming a 
deduction for wages taxable at a 20% rate, and paying workers taxable 
at 15%. 
P. Low-Cost Insurance in the Event of Repeal 
Proponents of the DBCFT argue that under the DBCFT, there 
would be no reason for a U.S. parent to transfer intellectual property 
to its offshore subsidiary because foreign royalties received directly by 
the U.S. parent would be exempt.  However, the drafters of the DBCFT 
assume that the DBCFT will remain in effect forever.  They are correct 
that if that were the case, there would be no reason for U.S. 
multinationals to transfer intellectual property to treaty-eligible, lower-
taxed affiliates.  However, if a DBCFT is enacted, there would remain 
a meaningful risk that it will be repealed or modified the next time that 
Democrats control the government, or when the United States has a 
trade surplus. 22   Even if there would be no immediate benefit to 
transferring intellectual property to low-taxed foreign affiliates under 
a DBCFT, doing so would provide low-cost insurance against a future 
reversal of U.S. tax policy.  Therefore, it is no stretch to predict that 
                                                      
22 This would be more likely if the DBCFT sunsets after ten years in order 
to pass through reconciliation. 
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enactment of a DBCFT will lead to the largest tax-free exodus of U.S. 
intellectual property ever. 
Because a sale by a U.S. multinational to its Irish subsidiary 
would be exempt from U.S. tax, the U.S. multinational would seek to 
maximize the transfer sales price.  This would allow the Irish 
subsidiary to amortize a high purchase price and use the amortization 
to generate deductions for Irish tax purposes.  (Ireland does not have a 
DBCFT, so the Irish subsidiary could amortize the “import”.)  The 
U.S. multinational might also have the Irish subsidiary borrow to 
finance the initial purchase of the IP to generate interest deduction.  
This would also generate deductions for Irish tax purposes.  Although 
the Blueprint would deny a U.S. parent net interest expense 
deductions, it does not appear to prevent the U.S. parent’s Irish 
subsidiary from using interest deductions to reduce its own earnings 
and profits and shelter any Subpart F income. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Blueprint promises a simpler tax code.23  This will be a 
broken promise.  A DBCFT won’t be simpler than our income tax, but 
the complexity will change.  The new tax planning strategies will 
include (i) generating deductions by making capital investments, (ii) 
exporting goods, services and intangibles to related parties, (iii) selling 
excess losses, (iv) using the earnings and profits rules to effectively 
deduct interest expense, (v) using aggressive transfer prices to 
minimize imports, (vi) converting carry to tax-exempt foreign services 
income, (vii) using partnerships to sell losses, (viii) using the for-profit 
the subsidiaries of tax-exempt entities to generate losses, (ix) using a 
U.S. corporation as a tax shelter, and (x) transferring intangibles 
abroad in anticipation of the eventual repeal of the DBCFT. 
 
 
                                                      
23 Blueprint, supra note 1, at 6, 15, 16, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34. 
